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Summary  findings
A successful poverty alleviation strategy has four distinct  Sincc poor  provinces are less  able to mobilize additional
clements: (1) identifying who the poor  are, where  they  local revenues to support  services, well-designed
are located,  and what they do,  (2) analyzing why they are  intergovernmental  transfers  are particularly  important.
poor,  (3) developing  policies to improve  their standards  Provinces  must play a greater role both  in raising
of living (usually aimed  at accelerating  economic growth  revenues and in allocating  expenditures,  with incentives
and  improving their income-earning  opportunities),  and  built  in to ensure that  they do so rcsponsibly and
(4) supplementing  income-improving  policies with direct  efficiently. Local governments must - if they are to be
.safety  net'  policies to increase the poor's  short-term  held accountable  for their  actions - have some
consumption  entitlements.  responsibility  for deterrnining  local tax rates. This will
The precise  mixture of 'capacity-improving"  allow  them to vary rates to collect more  revenues to
investments and "safety net'  policies appropriate  for any  finance higher levels of public services if they so choose,
country will depend  on the country's  income  ievel, the  and at the same time allow the central  government  to
extent  and nature  of its povcrty problem,  and  many  design its transfers  in such a way as to ensure that local
other factors. The strategy chosen must be implemented  fiscal efforts are not discouraged  by the  receipt  of such
effectively. Spending and revenue decisions need ro be  transfers.
more decentralized  to ensure that  the poverty alleviation  Richer provinces wi;l rend to coliect greater  revenues.
policies adopted  reflect the preferences,  needs, and fiscal  When transfers  are  needed to finance  local spending  in
abilities of different regions  of the country.  The nature of  poorer  areas, they should provide incentivecs  for local
that decentralization  depends on  the country.  revenue mobilization  and allow for some degree of
Pro-poor  services throughout  Viet Nam  are  equalization.  Services deemed  of national  importance
underfunded.  This problem  is particularly  acute in the  (for example,  a minimum level of educarion,  health  care,
poorer  areas. Improvements  in the system of  and social  relief) can be promoted  by designing specific-
intergovernmental  finances could  help ensure that each  purpose  transfers. These scrvices must be identified  and
level of government,  even in the poorer  provinces,  is  varying matching  requirements  established for different
adequatcly  funded  - and  provided with sufficient  provinces depending  on such factors as their  own
expenditure  and revenue raising autonomy  - to support  revenue base and the cost of providing services in that
local investments and  their operation  and maintenance.  province.
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larger effort  in the department  to develop  a comprehensive  povery  alleviation  strategy for Viet  Nam. This paper  was
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I. Introduction
A successful poverty alleviation strategy in any country has four distinct elements.
First,  who are the poor?  Where are they located,  and what do rhey do?  Second,  why are they
poor?  Only  after  we know who the poor  are,  where they live,  what they do,  and have some
idea of the causes of poverty,  can the third element in the strategy, the design of a set of specific
policies  to  improve  the living standards of the poor,  be determined.  Experience  suggests that
policies aimed at accelerating economic growth  and enhancing income-earning  opportunities  for
the poor are generally  needed to provide a lasting solution to the poverty problem.  In addition,
however,  such policies  often need to be supplemented  by more direct  measures  to increase  the
consumption  entitlement  of  the poor  in  the  short  term.  The  precise  mixture  of  "capacity-
improving"  and  "safety net"  policies  appropriate  for  any country will depend  upon  its income
level,  the extent  and nature of the poverty problem,  and many other factors.  Finally,  whatever
policies  are  finally  chosen  must  of  course  be  implemented  effectively  tO ensure  the  benefits
actually accrue  to the targeted groups.
Fiscal decentralization  enters  into this  picture  ac several  different  levels.  First,
some  degree  of  decentra!liztion  of  expenditure  and  revenue  decisions  may  be  considered
desirable - even essential - to ensure that the policies adopted with respect to poverty  alleviation
(or  anything  else)  adequately  reflect  the  varying  preferences  and  characteristics  of  different
regions  of  the  country.  Although  the  extent  to  which  this  "decentralization  theorem"  (or
"principle  of subsidiarity")  actually influences policy in any country will of course depend upon
how a nation's  political  institutions are organized,  the academic  literature  demonstrates  clearly
that  decentralized  provision  of  public  services  is  preferable  whenever  there  are  significantlocalized  dilferences  in  preferences.'  The  extent  of  actual,  desirable  or  potential
decentralization  is  thus  one  important  factor  in  determining  the  appropriate  mix  of  poverty
alleviation  policies  in any  country.
Secondly,  regardless  of  the  extent  to  which  local  preferences  determine  the
policies  that are  adiopted, the efficient  and  effective  implementation  of these  policies  may  in
many cases depen-d upon the close involvement of local governance  institutions.  That  is, even
if  the same levei of  service  is in principle to be  provided  everywhere,  the assumption  is that
those  -overnments  that are  "closer  to the people"  - if only  because they are responsible  to (or
for) fewer of them - should as a rule be able to provide services more efficiently and effectively
than a  remote,  centralized  authority.
From an efficiency  point of view, the basic rule of expenditure assignment  is thus
to  assign  each  function  to  the  lowest  level  of  government  consistent  with  its  efficient
peifonnatace.  So  long  as  there  are  local  variations  in  tastes  or  costs,  there  are  potential
efficiency  gains  from  carrying  out  public  sector  activities  in  as  decentralized  a  fashion  as
possible.  Fro;_ this  perspective,  the only services that should  be provided  centrally  are those
for which there are no differences  in demands in different  localities,  where there are substantial
'spillovTrs" between jurisdictions  that cannot be handled  in some other way (by contracting,  or
bv <rant design).  or those for which the additional costs of local administration  are sufficiently
high to ourweich its advantages.  In short, most public services should probably  be delivered  at
the local level, with local decision-makers deciding,  perhaps within central guidelines  or subject
to central monitoring  of performance,  what services are provided,  to whom, and in what quantity
and  quality.  Some  degree  of  decentralized  implementation  tnus  generaliy  constitutes  a  key
component  of many government  policies,  including  those concerned  with poverty  alleviation.
The classical statement is in Wallace E  Oates, Fiscal Federalism (New York, 1972).
2Thirdly,  since an efficient  revenue system almost  inevitably means that locally-
collected  revenues will be lower than local expenditures  - this is sometimes called the "vertical
balance"  problem - fiscal transfers  from the central government are invariablv needed to finance
some of the services that local governments should provide on efficiency grounds. Efficient local
government  thus  has  two  "bottom  lines"  in  terms  of  accountability.  The  first  level  of
accountability  is to local taxpayers  for  the use made of revenues collected  from them,  and  the
second  is to the central goverrnent  for the appropriate use of transfers  intended to achieve such
specific  purposes  as  pcverty  alleviation.  Both  local  revenue  systems  and  intergovernmental
transfers  need  to  be  appropriately  designed  to  provide  local  governments  with  appropriate
incentives to carry  out policies  efficiently  and to make full use of local resources.'
Finally,  there is considerable regional variation within most countries.  Different
regions  (and  subcentral  political  units)  may have different  rneeds and  preferences  in  terms  of
poverty  alleviation,  and different  capacities  to meet those needs and preferences.  Not all  local
governments  are created equal:  there are big cities and small ones, urbanized  localities and rural
ones,  rich units  and poor.  Providing  local services fairly and efficiently  in this diverse setting
r-ives rise  to  what  is  sometimes  called  the  prcblem  of  "horizontal  imbalance."  If  poverty
alleviation  is a national policy concern,  but some key poverty alleviation policies are delivered
by subnational  governments,  the capacity of different governments  to finance such services out
of  their  own  resources  is  likely  to  differ  greatly.  Another  critical  element  in  the design  of
intergovernmental  transfers  may  thus  be  to  ensure  that  the poorer  localities  have  sufficient
resources  to deliver  the desired  "package"  of services at an acceptable  level.3
- See R.M.  Bird,  "Threading the Fiscal Labyrinth: Some Issues in  Fiscal Decentralization,"
National Tax Journal, September 1993.
;  Although widely accepted in  federal countries (see A.Shah,"Perspectives on  the Design of
Intergoverrunmental  Fiscal  Relations"  WPS  726,  W.B,  July  1991),  the  extent  to  which
"equalization"  in this sense should be an aim of policy is vigorously disputed by some: see, for
example, William Oakland, "Fiscal  Equalization:  An Empty Box?" National  Tax Journal, March
1994.
3This paper considers  how fiscal decentralization  and  intergovernmental  transfers
affect poverty alleviation policy in Viet Nam.  By way of background,  Section II briefly reviews
the poverty  profile  in Viet Nam  and  highlights  both the prevalence  of poverty  throughout  the
country as well as its geographic concentration  in certain regions.  It also emphasizes  the critical
role of local public expenditures  in ensuring the accessibility to social and economic services that
is  needed  to  address  poverty.  '  Section  III  reviews  the  present  assignment  of  taxes  and
expenditures  and  intergovernmental  fiscal arrangements  and notes a number  of shortcomings  in
the design and implementation of intergovernmental  transfers.  Finally,  Section IV contains some
sugeostions  for  reforming  intergovernmental  fiscal arrangements and  hence  improving poverty
alleviation  policies.
Il.  Poverty,  Public  Policy,  and  Fiscal Decentralization!
The  Viet  Nam  Living  Standards  Survey  (VLSS)  highlights  four  important  features  of
poverty  in Viet Nam:
- The overall  incidence of poverty  is extremely  high; the consumption  level of 51 %
of  the population  is below  a widely  used international poverty  line 5. Even in the
relatively  prosperous  Mekong  Delta,  half  the  population  survive  at  per  capita
consumption  levels below  this poverty line.
*  There  are significant regional  disparities in living standards  throughout the country.
Poverty  incidence ranges  from  33%  in the southeast  to 717% on the north  central
coast.
4  Viet Nam has three levels of sub-central government: provinces, districts, and communes. We
shall refer to all of these as "local governments" although for the most part our analysis will
focus solely on the most important of these levels, namely, the 53 provinces.
5  The poverty line constructed on the basis of a basket of goods in which the food items contain
2.100  calories per person per day  and the non-food items reflect the  cost of basic goods
consumed by people who just reach the poverty line.
4a  Rural areas throughout  the country are much poorer  than urban  (i.e.  57%  poverty
incidence  in rural  areas versus 26%  in urban  areas).  Rural poverty  accounts  for
90%  of the poor  (Table  1).
*  Mlore than  three  quarters  of the poor  in Viet  Nam  --  76%  -- are  concentrated  in the
farming  population.
Table  1
Incidence  of Poverty  (%)
Region  Rural  Urban  Total
N.  Mountains  63  34  59
Red River  Delta  55  15  49
N. Central  Coast  74  42  71
Central  Coast  54  36  49
Central  Highlands  50  --  50
South  East  45  17  33
Mekong  Delta  52  28  48
Average  57  26  51
Regions  consist  of the  following  provinces:  N.  Mountains-  Lao Cai,  Yen Bai,  Ha  Giang,  Tuyen
Quang, Cao Bang, Lang Son. Bac Thai, Vinh Phu, Son La, Hoa Binh, Ha Bac, Quang Niri;  Red
River Delta  -Ha Tay,  Ha Noi, Hai  Phong,  Hai  Hung, Thai  Binh, Ninh Binh,  Nam Ha;  N. Central
Coast - Thanh  Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh,  Quang Binh, Quang Tri, Thua Thien;  Central Coast - Quang
Nam, Quang Ngai,  Binh Dinh,  Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa, Ninh Thuan,  Binh Thuan; Central  Highlands -
Gia Lai,  Dac Lac, Lam Dong; South East - Song Be, Tay Ninh, Ho Chi Minh City,  Dong Nai, Ba
Ria;  Mekong  Delta - Long An, Tien Giang, Ben Tre,  Vinh Long,  Tra Vinh,  Dong Thap, An Giang,
Kien Giang,  Can Tno,  Soc Trang,  Minh Hai.
5Table  2
Real  Per  Capita  Expenditures  By Region  *(thousand  dong)
Renion  Rural  Urban  Total
North  Mountains  936  1415  1007
Red River  Delta  1151  2457  1349
North Coast  934  1401  974
Central  Coast  1239  1951  1457
Central  Highlands  1159  1159
South  East  1610  2509  2008
Mekon-  Delta  1300  2453  1506
Weighted  Ave.  1189  1741  1373.1**
Expenditures have been adjusted for regional price differences.
Equivalent to $129.
Average per  capita annual expenditure  in Viet Nam was found  in the survey
to be  1,373 thousand  dong;  yet those in the north central region spend less than a half (974
thousand  don-)  of what those  in the southeast (2,008  thousand  dong) spend.  In addition  to
regional disparities,  intra-regional  differences in living standards,  and specifically urban-rural
differences,  are very pronounced.  Urban per capita expenditures  are much higher than rural,
on average  1,741 thousand  dong for urban  and  1,189 thousand  dong for rural.  Indeed-  the
urban  areas in the poorest  regions of Viet Nam are still more prosperous  than the rural areas
of  the  wealthier  provinces  (except  for  the  southeast  where  the  rural  areas  are  thriving)
(Table  2).  It  is  important  to  note that  in  this analysis  adjustmnents have  been  made  for
differences  in regional  price  levels.
6Talble  3
Poverty, Inicomie  Levels  anid  Social Indicators in Different  Regions
Region  Poverty  Rate  Per Capita  Density  of  111i1c-  infant  Maternal  Agricultural  Per Capita
G  DP 1993  Population  racy  Mortality  Mortality  Productivity  Produiction
(thi.  dongs)  Pcr  sq. kmi.  Ratec  Rawe  (Per  Rate  (Per  (Paddy  Agriculture
Rural  Total  (1989  1000  1000  equivalent)  + Industiry
Prices)  births)  births)  Tons/Hcctare  (Th. dong.,
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)
1. Northern  Mountains  63  59  332.5  115  18.9  52.3  2.1  2.07  321.5
2. Red  River  Delta  55  49  448.4  1085  7.2  44.2  1.7  2.74  431.4
3. North  Centra  Coast  74  71  277.6  181  10.2  54.2  2.1  2.25  257.2
4. South  Central  Coast  54  50  331.2  157  12.3  50.6  2.2  3.13  385.2
5. Central  Highlands  50  50  380.8  50  25.6  69.1  2.8  2.36  328.5
6. Southeast  45  33  1117.5  358  10.1  37.4  1.5  2.67  1281.9
7. Mekong  Delta  52  48  472  325  15.3  51.7  2  3.95  608.1
All Regions  57  51  478.2  209  13.1  49.5  2  3.06  523.7
Percentage  of population  above 10  years  who  never  attended  the school  has  been  taken  as a proxy  for illiteracy  rate  in the absence  of regionwise  data  on literacy.  The
Census  Atlas  gives  percentage  of population  never  attended  school  for diffcrent  agc groups  above  10  in each  of thc provinces.  By  applying  the age  of composition  in
the country  (information  on provincewise  age  composition  is not available),  the estimate  for cach  of the provinces  and  regions  has been  obtained.
Source:  1.Columns  2,3 and  4 - Staff  Estimates
2.Columns  5, 9, 10, 12  and 13  - General  Statistical  Office
3.Column  6 - Viet  Nam  Population  Census;  Central  Census  Stcering  Committee
4.Colurnns  7 and 8 - Ministry  of Health,  Government  of Viet  Nam.
7As  illustrated  in  Table  3,  poverty  is  not  only  associated  with  low  per  capita
income,  low population  density,  and  low agricultural  productivity  but  is also  reflected  in  low
indicators  of  human  development  such  as the  infant  mortality  rate,  maternal  mortality,  and
illiteracy.  The  inverse relationship  between the poverty  incidence and  agricultural  productivity
reflects  at  least in  part the importance  of such  "economic  services"  as  irrigation,  agricultural
extension.  and the provision  of rural credit in reducing poverty.  Similarly, the high poverty rate
in areas of low population  density reflects  in part the lack of social and economic  infrastructure
for the population  in mountainous and  remote  regions.
Public  Expenditure  and  Poverty Alleviation
The efficacy of any public expenditure policy in alleviating poverty depends upon
three  important  factors.  First,  how much is spent on programs  with direct  or indirect  impacts
that  reduce poverty?  Second,  where  is it sVent? That  is, to what  extent  are these expenditures
directed  to those  regions and provinces with  large concentrations  of poverty?  Third,  how well
is it spent?  That  is,  to what extent  are policies  implemented  so that the benefits  accrue  to  the
intended  groups?  Expenditures  intended  to  reduce  poverty  may  be  incurred  directly  by the
central government.  Alternatively,  they may be carried out by local governments  with their own
resources  or  with  resources  channelled  to  them  from  the  center  through  intergovernmental
transfers.  Since, as noted in the introduction,  in many instances local governments  may be able
to  implement  poverty  alleviation policies  more  efficiently  than  the central  government,  some
measure  of  expenditure  decentralization  is  likely  to  prove  necessary  to  ensure  effective
implementation  of expenditure  policies.  What is critical,  however,  is to ensure  that the terms
on which the resources needed to carry out such policies are made available to local governments
are such as to encourage  both local fiscal effort and efficient  implementation,  while at the same
time  recognizing  adequately  the considerable  divergence  in the  capacities  of  govermnents  in
different  regions  of the country.
8Table  4
Government  Expenditure  in Viet  Nani,  1992
Total  Per capita  Per  Per  Provincial
expendi-  expcndi-  cent or  ce!nt  govcrnment
turc (Bn.  ture  GDP  of  expenditure
Dongs)  (Dongs)  t  otal
A.  CLrrer.m  Expenditure
I . General acministratioii  2404  34687  2.4  10.2  43.1
2.  Economic services*  1495  21571  1.5  6.3  78.9
3.  Social services  6240  90035  6.1  26.4  46.0
il  Education  1495  21571  1.5  6.3  88.6
ii)  Ilealtli  1136  16391  1.1  4.8  88.1
iii) Pensions  2369  34182  2.3  10.0
iv)  Others  1240  17892  1.2  5.2  15.1
4.  Interest  3218  46432  3.2  13.6
S.  Others  5314  76674  5.2  22.5  18.9
Total Curremt Expenditure  18671  269399  18.3  79.0  35.9
B - Capital Expenditure  4956  71509  4.9  21.0  34.4
Total Expenditure  23627  390908  23 2  100.0  35.5
*  zsEconomic  services" consists of agriculture and  irrigation, forestry, industry, transport and
communication  and other economic services.  The details of individual items are not available.
Source:  Ministry  of Finance,  Government  of Viet Nam-
In 1992, total government expenditure  was D 23,627 bn, or 23 per cent of GDP,
of which the provinces  accounted for 35 per cent.6 In per capita terms, provincial  expenditure
s  Provincial expenditures include those of the district governments.  The lowest level of local
government, the conmmune,  is , however, excluded from these estimates.  Henceforth, the term
"local governments" refers to provinces (including districts) and exclud2s  communes, on which
9was about D  126,000 or about U.S.  $12,  and since, as shown in Table  4, capital expenditures
constituted  about 20 per cent of the total,  on average,  local governments  had little more than $2
(U.S.)  per head  lo invest.  Although  similar low figures are not un}known  in other  low-income
countries  - in Iran.  Malawi,  and Paraguay,  for example,  local government  spending  was even
lower  in  1991 - the contrast  with  countries  such as  the  United  States,  where  in  1991  local
aovernments  spent,  on  average,  over  $2,000  per  capita  and  state  and  local  governments
combined  spent  about $3,000,  or Korea,  where over  a decade  ago,  in the early  1980s, some
cities  spent  as much  as $200  (U.S.)  per  capita,  is striking.7 The  absolute  level  of resources
available  to  local  governments  in  Viet  Nam  is  so  low  as  to  make  it  difficult  for  those
governments  to  provide even the most minimal  level of service.
Moreover,  the variations  between  apparently comparable  units  within  countries
are often  almost as striking as those among countries..  In the United States, for example,  per
capita local expenditures  in  1990 in the lowest state were less than one-seventh  of those in the
highest state,  and in Indonesia in 1990/91,  it was only 7 percent.  A particularly  striking feature
in almost every country,  developed or developing,  is the difference between big cities and other
local  oovernments.  In Colombia  in the late 1970s, for example,  per capita tax revenues were
ren times  higher  in the capital,  Bogota,  than in the many small  rural  municipalities,  while  in
Canada  in the same period,  the ratio of per capita local revenues among provinces  was almost
the same. with  the more urbanized  areas having ten times the "own-source" per capita revenues
of the more rural areas. Such variation reflects two different factors in most  countries:  big cities
are richer,  and  they tend to carry  out a wider  range of functions.  Both of these factors are at
work  in Viet  Nam as well,  as noted below.
little information is available.
7  Comparative  data are from R.M. Bird, "Financing  Local Services:  Patterns, Problems,  and
Possibilities," Paper prepared for Global Report on Human Settlements, April 1994.
10Table  5
Government  Investment  Expenditure  by Functional  Categories  in Viet  Nam
(Million  dongs,  1982 price)
1985  1991  Share in Total
Expenditure - 1991
1. Economic services  19356.0  18056.9  83.0
i)  Indusury  7752.1  9397.1  43.2
ii)  Agriculture  4608.5  2973.5  13.7
iii)  Forestry  786.1  432.1  2.0
iv)  Transport  4454.6  3636.4  16.7
v)  Communication  140.7  834.4  3.8
vi)  Ocher economic  1614.0  783.4  3.6
services
2. Social and Community  5483.4  3705.5  17.0
Services
i)  Housing  2067.0  1084.7  5.0
ii)  Education  747.3  763.8  3.5
iii)  Culture  494.9  434.9  2.0
iv)  Public health  766.9  615.2  2.8
v)  Other social and  1047.3  806.9  3.7
community services
Total  24839.4  21762.4  100.0
The  basic  inadequacy  of  local  fiscal  resources  has  been  exacerbated  by
stabilization  policies  since  1989,  which  have  in particular  severely  compressed  investment
expenditures.'  In. 1991, capital expenditures  in constant  prices was actually  lower  than the
corresponding  figures  for 1985 even in absolute terms (Table  5).  This  compression  appears
to have been especially marked with respect to expenditures  on agriculture and  irrigation,  and
to some extent  roads.  Although the share of governrment expenditure in GDP increased  from
less than 20 per cent  in 1985 to 23 per cent in 1992, the share of expenditures  on agriculture,
irrigation and  roads  - the three  most  identifiable and  important items  from  the viewpoint  of
poverty alleviation  - has actually declined.9
8  See, Viet Nam - Transition to the Market, The World Bank, 1993.
9  Although Table 4 shows important  expenditures  on "social  services," the bulk of this item -about
10 per cent of total expenditures - consists of pensions to war veterans.
11Table 6
Provincial  Per Capita  EIxpenditures by Regions 1993
( Current  Prices,  thousand  doiigs)
Per  Capi:-  Working  Current  Ecun-  Eduic-  Trri  1knlih  Scicn  Culilu  ocial  Olwers  Total
Capita  al  Capital  Expcnel  Oimic  alion  ning  -ti  fc  -rc  Insura  IExpend
1993  Expe-  and  -iture  Servi  lacsca  and  -ncc  -i urc
GDP  nditu-  Subsidy  *ccs  -rch  Sport
(1989  re  to SOEs*
price)
1. North  Mountain  Region  332.5  22.3  2.4  94.4  15.5  25.4  3.6  10.8  0.6  3.3  4.5  12.7  119.1
2. Red River Delta  448.4  20.5  3.8  102.0  26.4  21.4  3.9  10.4  0.9  3.4  7.5  16.9  126.3
3. Central  Coast  - Northland  277.6  13.5  2.0  67.5  8.5  21.6  3.6  8.9  0.4  2.7  3.0  8.7  83.0
4. Central  Coast  - Southland  331.2  20.4  5.5  96.2  16.1  23.8  4.8  9.5  0.7  2.7  2.2  13.8  122.0
5. Central  Highlands  380.8  25.4  3.4  105.6  13.2  29.6  5.5  12.6  0.7  4.1  2.2  9.9  134.5
6. Northeast  of Southland  1117.  31.8  21.5  181.8  59.7  30.4  5.3  21.6  1.1  7.3  11.0  22.4  235.1
7. Mekong  River Delta  472.0  13.7  5.2  80.2  14.1  21.2  3.9  8.8  0.5  2.6  2.4  15.2  99.1
8. Average  478.2  19.9  5.6  100.6  21.9  23.0  4.1  11.3  0.7  3.6  4.9  14.8  126.1
*  SOEs  =  Statc  Owned  Enterprises
Source: State  Planning  Committee,  Government  of Viet Nam.
12Table  7
Per  Capita  Expenditures  in Provinces  Classified  According  to Income  Categories  (1993)
(Eh. dongs)
Expenditure  High  Income'  Middle  Income:  Low  Income'  All
Provinces  (Per  Provinces  (Pcr  Provinces  (Per  Provinces
Capita  GDP)  >  Capita  GDP)  >  Capila  GDP  <
450  th.  Dongs  300 - 450  th.  Dongs  300  th.  Dongs
1991 (Actual)
1.  Capital  expenditure  22.4  10.0  12.2  15.9
2.  Current  expenditure. of  70.9  47.4  49.0  58.2
which
(i)  Education  13.4  11.3  10.9  12.2
(ii)  Health  8.8  4.6  11.9  6.5
3.  Total  expenditure  93.3  57.4  61.2  74.1
1992 (Actual)
1.  Capital  expenditure  34.6  14.9  20.8  25.0
2.  Current  cxpenditure.  of  126.3  73.6  79.7  98.1
which
(i)  Education  22.0  17.3  17.4  19.4
(ii)  Health  1337  7.8  7.8  10.4
3.  Total  expenditurc  160.9  88.5  100.5  123.1
1993 ( Budget  Estimates)
1.  Capital  cxpenditure  27.0  14.0  19.9  19.9
2  Working  capital  and  12.4  2.8  2.4  5.6
subsidy  to SOES
3.  Current  expenditurc.  of  139.2  78.9  82.5  100.6
which
(i)  Economic  services  40.4  11.1  13.7  21.9
(ii)  Education  26.5  21.8  23.3  23.0
(iii)  Hcalth  14.7  9.3  4.4  11.3
(iv)Training  & scientific  6.2  4.0  9.8  4.8
rescarch
(v)  Others  51.4  32.7  31.3  39.6
4.  Total  expenditure  178.6  95.7  104.7  126.6
I  The high income provinces are:  Ba Ria-Vung Tau. Ho Chi Minh city.  Ha Noi. Dong Nai. Kien Giang.
Quang Ninh  .Khanh Hoa. Hai Phong. Hoa Binh. Vinh Long. Tra Vnh.  Long An. An Giang. Can Tho, Minh
Hai and Dac Lac
2.  The middle income provinces are: Ticn Giang. Yen Bai. Soc Trang.  Bac Thai. Tay Ninh. Ben Tre. Song
Be. Lam Dong. Dong Thap. Quang Nam. Hai Hung. Vinh Phu, Thanh Hoa, Nam Ha. Thai Binh. Kon Tum.
Lai Chau. Phu Yen and Ha Tay.
3.  The low income provincres  are: Long Son. NinL.  Binh. Tuyen Quang. Ha Bac. Ninh Thuan, Gia Lai, Thua
Thien Hue. Quang Binh, Binh Dinh, Binh Thuan. Cao Bang. Quang Tri. Nghe An. Quang Ngai. Ha Tinh.
Ha Giang, Lao Cai and Son La.
Source:  Ministry  of  Finance and  State  Planning  Committee,  Government  of Viet  Nam.
13Unfortunately,  the provincial distribution of central government  expendiEure is not
available.  Although  it is possible that such expenditure may be allocated to some extent to offset
the disequalizing  effects  of provincial  expenditure,  only  the latter can be  analyzed  here.  In
general.  as  Table  6  shows,  per  capita  provincial  expenditures  are  clearly  higher  in  more
prosperous  re-ions.  The  highest  budgeted  per  capita expenditure  was  in  the  North-east  of
Southland  (Ho Chi  Minh City) and  the lowest was in the North-Central  coastal region,  where
per capita  income was also lowest.  The correlation  is not perfect,  however,  since the relatively
prosperous  Mekong river delta region also had very low per capita expenditures,  exceeding only
the North-central  coastal  region.
A similar  pattern emerges  for expenditures  on different  items for all three years
shown  in  Table  7,  with  per  capita  expenditure  in  high  income  provinces  being  consistently
highest. In aggregate,  per capita expenditure  in the high income provinces was 26 per cent above
average  in  1991. 31  per cent  in 1992 and  about 41 per cent  in 1993.  Interestingly,  however,
the distribution  of per  capita current  expenditures  on education and health  was markedly  more
even.  Moreover,  per  capita  expendiEures  in  low  income  provinces  were,  on  the  whole,
marginally  higher than those in middle income provinces. To some extent,  this result may reflect
the "equalizing"  effect of the present system of intergovermnental transfers  (see later discussion)
as well as the  fact that some of the centrally-determined  salary scales of provincial  employees
are  hicher  in  more  remote  regions,  thus  raising  expenditures  in those  regions  On the other
hand,  the low levels of expenditures  in the middle income provinces,  some of which are located
in the delta region,  may suggest that in part their high concentrations  of poverty reflect less their
lack of development  potential than their lack of the infrastructure needed to realize that potential.
Nonetheless,  a positive and significant correlation  was found between  per capita
GDP  and  per  capita  provincial  expenditures  in  both  1992 and  1993,  confirming  that  on the
average  relatively  more  affluent  provinces  have  higher  per  capita  expenditures  even  though
provincial  budgets  are, as discussed below,  largely  determined  by the central government.
14Two important inferences emerge from this discussion.  First,  the amount of
resources available at the provincial level is so low in absolute terms that it is unlikely to have
more than a very limited impact on poverty. Second, the distribution of resources  among the
provinces appears to favor those who have, in the sense that the relatively better off provinces
on the whole spend more in per capita terms.  Although some unit costs of providing some
public services may be higher than the national average in more urbanized areas, others will be
lower.  Cost differentials alone seem unlikely to account for these results.  Indeed, in the north
mountainous region, where low population  density means that the unit costs of providing public
services are also likely to be well above average, per capita expenditures  were actually slightly
below average.
Role of  Local  Governments  in Poverty Alleviation
What is the role of local govermnents  in undertaking  expenditure  policies  targeted
to reduce poverty?  Although the potential inter-provincial mobility of population limnits  the
efficacy of sub-central governments in undertaking redistributive policies.'° local authorities
should have a comparative advantage  in identifying the poor.  They may also be more efficient
providers both of social and community  services such as health and water supply and economic
services such as agricultural extension, irrigation and roads, particularly in rural  areas.  In
addition, as noted earlier, in principle an essential function of local governments is to satisfy the
varying preferences of people  residing in different  jurisdictions by providing  differing mixes and
levels of public services.  Local governments may thus play an important role in deciding and
implementing expenditure policies, including those intended to alleviate poverty.
10  See, Brown,  C.C. and W.E. Oates, "Assistance  to the Poor in a Federal  System"  Jounal of
Public  Economics, Vol. 32 pp. 307-330,  1987  and Ladd, H., and  F.C. Doolittle,  'Which Level
of Government  Should  Assist  the Poor",  National Tax Journal, Vol. 35, 1982.
15On the  other  hand,  since  most  taxes  are  more  efficiently  collected  by  central
governments,  an essential  ingredient of the fiscal structure  in most countries is also a system  for
transferring  resources  from  the  central  to  the  local  governments.  An  ideal  set  of
intergovernmental  fiscal arrangements,  for example,  might  include the following  elements:  (i)
adequate  resources  in the hands of local governments  as a whole,  from  a combination  of local
taxes and  central transfers,  to enable  them to carry out  their assigned  functions;  (ii)  a transfer
system that ensures each individual local government has sufficient resources  to provide essential
functions  at an acceptable  standard,  provided  local taxes  are imposed at reasonable  rates;  (iii)
sufficient  tlexibility  in setting local taxes and charges so that local govermnments  can respond  to
the preferences.  special problems,  and resource endowments prevailing in different  regions;  (iv)
but  at  the  same  time,  sufficient  incentive  to  ensure  that  local  fiscal  effort  is  maintained  at
reasonable  levels and that local budgets are managed efficiently;  and (v) where minimum  levels
of  spending  on  particular  programs  are  considered  of  national  importance,  special  central
transfers  financed  in whole  or in part by specific-purpose  transfers.
Such an  ideal  system is seldom found  in practice,  and certainly not  in countries
sucb  as  Viet  Nam  in  which  traditionally  a  unified  budget  has  been  employed  as  a  tool  to
implement  central  planning.  Nonetheless,  an essential  but often  unduly neglected  part  of  the
transition  towards  a more market-oriented  economy  is precisely  a change in the budgetary  and
intergovernmental  system.  From  this  perspective,  it may prove  useful  to keep this  "ideal"  in
mind as a point of reference.
III.Intergovernmental  Fiscal  Arrangements  in  Viet Nam
Expenditure  Alocation
The assignment  of expenditures  to different  levels of government  in Viet Nam  is
based  on a resolution  of the Council  of Ministers  passed  in November,  1989,  as subsequently
16amended.  Local  governments  are  responsible  for  ensuring  law  and  order  within  their
jurisdictions.  but,  as  in  many other  countries,  with  a  few  exceptions  such as defence,  most
responsibilities  are  shared  more  on  the  basis  of the  size  of  the  projects  than  the  type  of
expenditure.  Large  investment  projects,  the  benefits  of  which  spill  over  to  a  number  of
provinces,  are central responsibilities,  while small projects benefiting  mainly the residents of a
province  are  undertaken  by  the  provinces.  Thus,  all  major  irrigation,  flood  control  and
embankment  projects and national highways are central responsibilities,  but the maintenance and
repair of minor irrigation works and roads other than national highways is a local responsibility.
Similarly,  primary  and secondary education  is primarily  assigned  to the provinces,  but  higher
education  is central,  and  major  hospitals are  managed by the center,  while the provinces  run
hospitals  in provincial towns and districts.  Provinces are also responsible for the public health
centers  run at the communal  level.
Table 8
Share  of Provincial Expenditures in Total,  1992
Total  Provincial  Share of Provincial
Expenditure  Expenditure  Expenditure  in
(Bn. Dongs)  (Bn. Dongs)  Total (Per cent)
1.  Currcnt Expenditure  18671.0  6697.5  35.9
1.  Gencral administrative  services  2404.0  1076.7  43.1
2.  Economic  services  1490.0  1176.3  78.9
3.  Social services  6245.0  2872.6  46.0
(i)  Education  1495.0  1325.0  88.6
(ii)  Health  1136.0  1000.3  88.1
(iii) Others  3614.0  547.2  15.1
4.  Other expenditures  8532.0  1612.0  18.9
11. Capital Expenditure  4955.8  1706.6  34.4
111.  Total Expenditure  23626.  8404.1  35.5
Source:Ministry of Fmance, Government  of Viet Nam.
17Table 8 shows that in aggregate, provinces account for about a third of total as
well as capital expenditures. Their role is especially important with respect to the provision of
social services, particularly education  and health.  Moreover,  although most capital expenditures
are central, the provinces play a major role in maintaining public investments, as may be seen
from the high proportion of current expenditure on economic services shown in the table.
In  recent years,  the  central government has introduced a  number of  special
programs, as shown in Table 9,  to cope with the perceived inadequacy of provincial spending
in areas to which the center wishes to give priority. Such programs are designed by the center
but implemented through the local governments.  They are thus similar to the specific puTpose
(non-matching) transfers seen in other countries, although the expenditures on these programs
are  shown only  in  the  central budget.  Expenditure on  all  these programs taken together
amounted in 1993 only to 1615 bn dongs, or about four per cent of total expenditure, with a
third of this figure being accounted for by reforestation.  Many of these programs are directed
to very specific activities, and the expenditure is spread so thinly across various sectors and
provinces that it is unlikely to have any significant  impact. In addition to these special programs,
the central government also administers pensions  to war veterans through the provinces: in 1993,
expenditure on this item alone amounted to 2374 bn. dongs, or far more than the total of all the
programs shown in Table 9
Although the  provinces account for a  significant proportion  of  govermment
expenditures in Viet- Nam,  their effective role in exercising expenditure decisions is very
limited.  During  the third  quarter  of the  year,  after consultations with  the  State Planning
Committee and various line ministries, the Ministry of Finance issues guidelines for preparing
the budget.  These guidelines (i) set out broad economic policy directions on  the basis of
projected macroeconomic and balance of payments situation in the ensuing year, (ii) specify the
policy parameters to be followed by all spending departmnents  including the local governments,
and (iii) lay down the detailed procedures for preparing the budget and prescribe the 'norms' for
18Table 9
Expenditure on Special Central Program  in Provinces
(Bn. dongs)
1993  1994
(Actuals)  (Budgeted  Estimates)
I.  Educadon  216  430
ti)  Popularising primary education and spread of literacy  30  40
(ii)  Education for mountain regions  60  s0
(iii) Separation or primary schools from secondary  schools  50  50
(iv)  Improvement in class rooms  100
(v)  Elimination or 3rd shift in schools  70  100
(vi)  Books and Newspapers for mountain pupils  8  15
(vii) Impruvemcnt in srcondary schools  6  25
(viii) Computer education for schools  20
2.  Training Programs  10  105
ti)  lmprtvement  in teaching material and courses  10  15
(ii)  Computer fior  schools  20
(iii) Upgrading  basic materials  20
3.  Medicine and health programs  132  305
(i)  UNICEF water supply programs for mountain region  1  5
(ii)  Anti-Malaria program  52  70
(iii) Anti-GoiLre  program  30  59
(iv)  Immunization program  15  25
(v)  Anti-HIV program  10  40
(vi)  Upgrading material bases  25  70
(vii) Establishing health care centers in non-existent areas  26
4.  Population and family planning program  93  225
5.  Cultural and information programs  30
ti)  Information and cultural activities for the communes  10
(ii)  Filmmaking. renovation and developing  10
(iii)  Cultural and historical heritage reproduction  10
6.  Child care  2  30
7.  Job programs.  300  250
8.  Support for Khmer, Cham and other minorities  10  30
9.  Administration of.boundary mapping  30  42
10. Pricc suppon policy for specified commodities  170  250
11. Project 327: Reforostation  584  610
12. Anti-social vice programs  60  70)
(i)  Anti-opium plantation  S0  S0
fii)  Abolition of prostitution  10  20
Total  1615  2377
19making projections of revenues and expenditures. Based on these guidelines, the tax department
prepares the forecast of revenues, and the State Planning Committee in consultation  with the
Ministry of Finance prepares the investment budget based on the proposals received from the
provinces and line ministries which, in turn, are finalized after feasibility studies conducted by
them. On the basis of the detailed norms specified for each item of expenditre,  the provinces
and line ministries then make projections of current expenditure.  The Ministry of Finance puts
together the estimates  of revenue from domestic  and foreign sources and attempts to balance the
investment and current expenditures with the projected revenues. After two or three rounds of
negotiations with the spending  ministries and provincial governments,  the estimates  are finalized
and submitted to the Prime Minister, who places it before the economic and budget committee
of National Assembly for review.  Each year, in early November, the estimates are submitted
to the spending committee of the National Assembly which after a scrutiny places them in the
National Assembly for approval.  The budget thus approved is communicated to all spending
departments and provinces and the latter in turn informn  the districts.
The provinces employ the districts primarily  as their spending  agencies.  They are
given a share in public enterprise taxes (profits tax, turnover tax and depreciation from State
enterprises).  The  provinces directly  spend most  of  the  capital  expenditures,  and  the
responsibility of districts is mainly to execute small investment projects and to maintain the
assets within their jurisdiction. Similarly, communes  are  allowed to retain 10 per cent of
revenue  from agricultural taxes and in addition receive a small grant,  mainly for holding
meetings.  Most development works are directly undertaken by the -rovinces, and minor works
are executed by the communes, often with voluntary contributions (mostly in kind) by  the
community itself.
Provincial budgets are thus passed by the National Assembly, and revenues are
basically assigned to meet the  budgeted expenditures. If,  during the course of the year, the
revenue collections assigned to the provinces exceed the targets, the excess revenmes  can either
20be put in the financial reserve fund or spent on capital expenditures,  major repairs or to enhance
outlays on education,  health and social  welfare.  If expenditures  exceed  the budgeted  amounts
as a  result of  a policy change  (e.g.,  wage revision),  an  additional  grant  may be  given by  the
center.  Unforeseen  increases  in  expenditure  may  also  be  met  from  withdrawals  from  a
contingency  fund established  by each province,  which  must be recouped during  the year.
Provinces  may thus spend more than the budgeted amounts only when their actual
revenue collections exceed  the targets  (budget estimate). Moreover,  current  expenditures  under
various  heads  are determined  on  the basis of the  norms  detailed  in the budget  circular,  and
provinces cannot alter the allocations  between different expenditure  heads.  Most provinces thus
have only limited flexibility  in taking expenditure decisions.  In practice,  however,  as discussed
later,  the more  prosperous  and  fast  growing  provinces are  more  likely  to exceed  the revenue
targets  in  absolute  terms  and  hence  to  be  able  to carry  out  more  investmnents.Although the
provinces  are required  to follow the detailed guidelines and norms  set out in the budget circular
in making  their current expenditure projections,  the expenditure  budget tfiat is fir,ally passed  in
the National  Assembly  is invariably  only a fraction  of what  the provinces  project.  Moreover,
although  the norms are,  as discussed  below,  relevant  in determining  the relative  shares of  the
provinces.  they  do  not  appear  to  be  based  on  realistic  estimates  of  the  cost  of  providing
reasonable  standards  of  services  or  satisfactorily  maintaining  the  economic  infrastructure.
Similarly,  the provinces submit numerous  investment proposals  to the State Planning Committee
after detailed project evaluation,  but in the final analysis, the projects included in the investment
budgets are chosen on the basis of considerations that are by no means clear and are only a small
proportion  of what is requested.
Concentration  of Tax  Powers
Before  1990,  the responsibility  for collecting  most  taxes  except  external  trade
taxes was vested with the provincial  governments.  The "unified  budget"  concept  introduced  in
21October 1990 centralized the tax powers. At present, policies relating to tax base and tax rates
in respect of all major taxes are decided at the Central level.  The tax collection machinery,
however,  is  responsible to  both  the  Ministry of  Finance and  to  the  Provincial Peoples'
Committees.  The salary of the tax officials is paid by the central tax department; at the same
time,  however,  these  officials  are  accountable to  the  Provincial  Peoples'  Committees,
particularly for fulfilling the revenue targets. Tax collections are deposited with the central
treasury.  The revenues from various taxes are then retumed to the provinces in part or full, on
the basis of their expenditure requirements as determined by the budgetary process describee,
earlier.
Unstable System of Revenue Assignment
The assignment of revenues to the provinces is done on a year to year basis,
depending on the allocation of expenditures to them. Revenues  and expenditures at the center
and in each of the provinces  are balanced by making a number of adjustments. To begin with,
the entire revenue from certain sources are assigned  to the provinces.  Proceeds from other taxes
are shared with the provinces, with the ratio received by each province being determined by the
gap between budgeted expenditures and 100 per cent assigned revenues.  If the proceeds from
the shared taxes are not adequate to fill the gap, a cash grant equivalent to the remaining gap
is riven.  Balance is thus brought about through adjustments in expenditures, in  assigned
revenues, in shared revenues, and in grants.  In addition, if, during the course of the year, the
government changes policies and prices which affect revenues and expenditures, the Ministry
of Finance  together  with  the Provincial  People's  Committees  recalculates  the budget  item  and
provides additional grants if necessary.
There is thus no fixity or stability about the revenue assigmnent, as may be seen
in Table 10. The revenues from external trade taxes, the special consumption tax, depreciation
and profit taxes of state-owned  enterprises vertically integrated with the center, and from major
22minerals  including crude oil are retained by the center.  In  1993, the center  retained the revenue
from  personal  income tax as well, but  in 1994 this source was assigned to the provinces  except
for Ba Ria-Vung  Tau (where  there  is oil).  The provinces  are assigned  the revenues  from  land
and  housing  tax,  slaughter  tax,  license  fee,  registration  fee,  depreciatL n  and  tax  on  local
enterprises,  revenue  from  lotteries,  and other minor  fees and taxes.  In 1993,  agricultural  tax
was shared  with the provinces,  but  in 1994 it was entirely assigned to the provinces.  Similarly,
in 1994, 50 per cent of profits  tax collected in 8 provinces will be retained by the center,  though
until  1993,  all  the  provinces  retained  the entire  amount."L  The  turnover  tax  is  the  major
balancing  item  which  is  shared  wiLh  the provinces  in both years though,  until  1993, all the
provinces received the entire amount.  As already mentioned, the share of turnover tax forms the
balancing  (ap-filling)  factor.'2 In  1994,  14 provinces  will receive  less  than  100 per  cent  of
turnover  tax and the remaining 39 provinces  will get cash grants in addition.(plus  100 per cent
of the tax).
As  noted  earlier,  in  an  ideal  system,  a  mix  of  general  purpose  and  specific
purpose  transfers  would  likely  be  required.  General  purpose  transfers  would  be  designed  to
ensure  that  fiscally  disadvantaged  provinces  would  be  able  to  provide  a  minimum  "national
sEandard" package  of public services at a reasonable  tax rate.  Such grants  should  generally  be
structured  to  take  into account  both the  "needs'  of different  provinces  and  their  "capacity"  to
meet their needs out of their own resources. If properiy designed, such nequalization"  grants can
also ensure  that local  fiscal efforts  are maintained  at reasonable  levels.'3
The eight rich provinces receiving 50 per cent of the share are, Ho Chi Minh City, Ha Noi, Ba
Ria-Vung Tau, Long An, Kien Giang, Dong Nai, Song Be and Quang Ninh.
12  Thus, a province's share of turnover tux is given by (ErR, )/T, if (E,-RR)  >  0 where E,, Rt and
Ti respectively represent expenditures, assigned revenues and revenue from tumover tax of the
i* province.
3  For  an  example of  such a  grant scheme, see  Bird  and Wallich, Financing Local
Govermnent in Hungary, WPS, 19 869, 1992.
23Table 10
Reveniic  Assignment  in Vietnam
Central  Revenues  Revenucs Assigned to the Provinics  Revenues Shared between Center and Provinces
1993  1994  1993  1994  1993  1994
1. Extemal trade taxes  1. ExternaJ Trade taxes  1. Land and housing tax  1. Agricultura! tax  !.  Six provinccs of  hlc  1. Turnover aiix: 14
Mvickong  River Delta  provinces reccived less
2. Special consumption  2.  Special consumption  2. Slaughter tax  2. Land and housing tax  rcccivcd sharcs of  than 100%  of the siharc
taxes  taxes  . agricultural taxes  and the remaining 39
3.  Licensc fcc/taxes  3. Slaughter tax  ranging from 60-8  provinces received the
3. Profits and  3. Profits and  percent. The remaining  entire collections
depreciation of public  depreciation of central  4. Registration taxes  4.  License fee/taxes  provinces received the
enterprises  public enterprises  entire collections  2.  45 provinces can
5. Depreciatloon and tax  5. Registration fees  receive the entire pTofit
4. Crude oil revenues  4. Crude oil revenues  on capital use and profits  2. Tumover tax  tax. In 8 provinces,
of provincial enterprises  6. Depreciation and tax  however, only 50% of
5. Personal income tax  on capital use and proftls  the revenue from the
6.  Profit tax  of provincial enterprises  tax  is assigned
7. Taxes on lottery  7. Personal income tax
(except in Ba Ria-  Vung
8. Small scale border  Tau)
import/export8.  Taxes on lottery
9. Transportation fees
9. Transportation  fees
10. Revenues from
forestry and  10. Revenues from
reforestation fees  forrstry and
rcrorestation fees
11. Other minor fees
and taxes
24In principle,  it may  be argued  there  is little rationale  for  making  such  general
grants unconditional.' 4 Not only does the central government  have a legitimate interest  in what
is done with  its grants,  but the nation as a whole also has a legitimate concern  in  ensuring  that
services  provided  by  local governments  such as education  and health are  available  throughout
the country at minimum standards.  There  is therefore  a case for at least limited conditionality,
for example,  by requiring  that grant funds should  be spent  on e.g.  education or  health  or by
requiring  local governments  receiving  such  grants  to  provide services of at least a specified
quality  and  level.  Ot course,  such  legal  requirements  are  inevitably  to  some  extent  only  pro
forna.  The fungibility of money and the ability of local governments to alter other expenditures
and taxes  mean that  requiring  a grant  to be spent on a particular  activity  does not necessarily
imply that  total  (centrally-funded  plus  locally-funded)  expenditure  on the activity  has gone up
proportionally.  Indeed,  in most cases it will not.  Nonetheless,  there is considerable  evidence
that conditionality  is likely to increase  the amount spent  on the designated  services  to at least
some extent.
Specific purpose transfers,  of course,  are those which are specifically  targeted to
poverty alleviation  or  other  programs.  Such  transfers  have been  found  to be  more  effective
when  the  recipient  local  governments  - the provinces,  in  this  case  - are  required  to  make
matching contributions.  Particularly when there remain significant disparities between localities
even after the distribution  of general  purpose grants,  as is likely to be true in Viet Nam in view
of the paucity of resources available,  higher subsidies (lower matching rates) may be appropriate
for  low-income  provinces  with larger  concentrations  of poverty.'5
14  The position taken here is set out in Bird, op. cit.  For an apparently  contrary view, although one
aimed more at large intermediate governrments  in federal states, see A. Shah, "Perspectives on
the Design of Intergovernmental  Relations,'  World Bank WPS 726, 1991.
5  For a detailed discussion of these issues, see, Rao, M.G. and A. Das-Gupta, "Intergovernmental
Transfers as an Instrument to Alleviate Poverty", Economic  Development Institute, The World
Bank. 1993.
25The present system of transfers in Viet Nam falls far short of these precepts.
Indeed, the concept of transfer itself is unclear.  At one extreme, as the provinces do not have
any independent  power to raise revenues, all their expenditure may be treated as transfers.  At
another. all revenue collections made by a province may be considered as its own; in such a
case, the difference between expenditures  and revenue collections may be construed as transfers.
A third option is to consider the transfers as the balancing component - the share of turnover
taxes and the cash grants received by provinces.  Finally, even the shares of tumover taxes may
be considered as  taxes assigned to  the provinces,  and only  the cash grants  considered as
transfers.
Expenditure projections
Whatever concept of transfers is adopted, the critical element in determining their
amount is, as mentioned  earlier, the preparation  of the expenditure  budget at the provincial level.
The process by which investment  projects is selected is both complicated  and non-transparent,
but considerations such as the need to finance continuing projects, the relative backwardness of
the  provinces,  the  priority  of  the  projects  as  perceived  by  the  central  government,  and  the
relative priorities of  the different provinces appear to  influence investment allocations.  In
addition. as noted above, the provinces may increase investment outlays if they raise more than
the targeted (budgeted) revenues in respect of taxes assigned to them.
The process of determining current expenditures  is equally complex.  The budget
circular sent to the provinces details the norms to be employed for projecting different items of
expenditure.  These "standardized" norms are applied to expenditure items such as education,
culture and information, training (higher education), sports, health, and administration. In the
case of maintenance expenditures on infrastructures like roads, bridges, embankments and
irrigation works, standardized norms (on a per capita basis) cannot be applied, so expenditures
are projected on the basis of specified norms for each item.
26The nonns  are developed for each expenditure item on the basis of the discussion
between  the Ministry  of Finance,  State Planning Committee  and the relevant central  Ministry.
In  most  cases,  population  is  the  major  factor  taken  into  account  but  different  weights  are
assigned  to  population  in  different  areas.  The  budget  circular  for  1994,  for  example,
distinguishes  between five different  categories:  (i) Cities,  (ii) Plains,  (iii) Midland and Coastal
areas. (iv) Low Mountains  and Remote areas, and (v) High Mountains and Islands.  In principle,
this distinction  is supposed to  take account of differences  in the needs as well as varying  unit
costs of providing  these services.
The standardized  norms  for  1994 for  various  items of expenditure  are shown  in
Table  11.  In the case of  education,  for example,  the normative  per  capita expenditures  vary
from  D 26,700  to  D 42,800.  Since provinces may contain  more than one type of area,  each
province  is  required  to project  its education  expenditures  on  the basis  of  its composition  of
population  in terms of the different  categories.
If properly designed, a system of establishing  expenditure "norms" may constitute
a useful  component  of a general  purpose transfer  program,  when combined with  a measure  of
local  capacity  to meet  costs out of own resources.  Such  norms  might,  for  instance,  take  into
account  differences  in the cost of providing  a "standard"  level of services in different  regions.
Such costs  might vary  with population  density,  the terrain,  and other factors.  In Viet Nam,
however,  although the norms apparently attempt to take some account of cost differences,  it is
not clear  that the central government  has adequate cost information on which to base the norms.
Moreover,  the  chosen  indicators  of  'need'  could be  improved.  In. the case  of education,  for
example,  costs are specified on per capita basis and not on the basis of population  in the school-
going  age group  or the number  of students.
If the age composition of population or the student-population ratio differs  between
provinces,  this norm may not properly  represent the need factor.  Nor is any distinction  made
27between  primary  and  secondary  education.  In  the  case  of  higher  education  and  training,
however,  the norm  is specified  in terms  of  number  of students.  Health  expenditures  too  are
determined  on a per capita basis.  Administrative  expenditures  are determined  on the basis  of
number  of  employees,  although  all  provincial  recruitment  and  the  salary  scales  have  to  be
approved  by the Central  government.
Another problem  is that resource constraints mean that the norms are set too low
to provide  reasonable  levels of service.  In the case of education,  for  example,  on average  the
expenditure  per  student in 1991-92 was only D 106,800  and expenditure  per  person of school-
going aoe was just only D 57,600  (about U.S.  $6).  Since  teachers'  salaries  itself accounted for
about  80  per  cent  of  this  amount,  little  was  left  for  books,  furniture  and  educational  aids.
Moreover,  alEhough the  norm  system  in  effect  allocates  expenditure  resources  among  the
provinces,  it does not seem to do so in a very  satisfactory way.  In Soc Trang,  one of the poor
provinces.  for  instance,  per student expenditure  of D 19,600  was actually  the lowest.  Indeed,
all spending  on education was less than 2 per cent of GDP,  or less than half the average  ratio
in the group  of developing  countries  with less than $ 300 per capita  income.'6
The  situation  is  no different  in  respect  of economic  services.  In  Thanh  Hoa
province.  where  cyclones are a recurring  phenomenon,  the sanctioned  budget for strengthening
and  maintaining  937  kms  of  embankments  is generally  only  about  10  per  cent  of  what  is
requested  by  the province  - which  itself  is only  a  fraction  of  what  is actually  needed  for  its
proper maintenance.  Even after mobilizing conmnunity help by way of voluntary labor (through
embankment  protection  committee),  the province  is thus  able to  select  only  the very  weakest
segments  of embanlknent  every year for  strengthening.  The story  appears  to be  the same  in
other sectors  and  in other provinces  as well.
16  The estimate for the developing countries is for 1987, and is taken from the Statistical Year
Book, 1989, UNESCO.
28Table  11
Norms for Determining  Current Expenditures  for
Standardized  Items  in Provinces 1994
Expenditure  Itcms  Unit  Cides  Plains  Midland  Low Moun-  High  Moun-
and Coas-  ta nous  and  tains and
tal Areas  Remote Areas  Islands
1.  Norms  Based tn  Catcgorization  of Regions
1. Education  Dongs  per capita  37.500  26.700  J9.400  33.500  42.800
2.  Culture  and  Dongs  per capita  3.750  2.500  2,940  3.350  4.Z80
information
3. Sports  Dongs  per capia  1.540  1.250  1.150  700  960
4.  Health:  Dongs  per capita
i)  Prcventive  4.750  3.340  3.700  4.170  5.340
ii)  Curative  10.520  7.520  8.270  9.400  12.030
5.  Administration  Mn dongs/per
(i)  Provincial  lev-el  employte  in pay mil  9-5  6.7  8.2  13.5  -
(ii) District  levcl  7.5  6.7  5.5  11.0  12.0
11.  Norms  Uniform  for all Regions
Norms for  Science  and  Pailgogy  Pedagogy  Agri..  Economics  Culture  and
Teehnical  Education  Technotogy  - Genral  - Higher  Formsty.  and  Lcgal  Arts
- Mn dongs  per  Fisheries  Affairs
sLudent  and Health
.ti  Cnilkcc  and  3.8  4.0  2.7  3.9  3.3  4.2
Universi1t
(iil  Technical  (3 yrs  2.4  2.5  - 2.1  1.9  3.0
after gencral
eduatkion)
(iii) Vocational  2.9  2.4  - 2.9
Source:  Ministsy  of Finance.  Govcrnmnmt or Vic  Nanm.
Revenue  projections
The expenditure  budgets of provinces  are determined  by the revenue  projection
for domestic  resources  (plus planned domestic borrowing  and external  assistance).  Analysis  of
29revenue projections,  however,  reveals that the tax department  consistently tends to underestimate
revenues.  The tax department  tends to set targets which can easily be reached.  Underestimation
is in the interest  of provinces  as well,  for,  once a tax is assigned  to  a province  for  the year,
collections  in excess of projections  provide some  flexibility  in the use of funds.  On the other
hand,  the State  Planning  Comrnittee  would like  to  have high  revenue  targets  so as  to  have a
larger  invesiment  budget-  Often,  the  projections  of  tax  department  and  State  Planning
Committee  differ  widely,  requiring  the Prime Minister  to take  the final decision.  Even  after
such negotiations,  however,  as Table  12 shows,  for the last three years,  actual collections  have
exceeded  targets  in every  single province.
Although  a larger share of some of the taxes collected in higher income provinces
goes  to  the center  and  though  in relative  terms  the  increase  in richer  provinces  was  actually
lower  than in poor provinces,  nonetheless in per capita terms,  the richer provinces still retained
higher  excess  collections  and  consequently  had  higher  per  capita  expenditures.  Estimated
expenditures  in per  capita  terms exceeded  the budgeted  amount  by  D 51,670  in  high  income
provinces.  by  D  26,800  in  middle  income  provinces,  and  by  D  31,030  in the  low  income
provinces.  The actual distribution  of public expenditures  among  provinces thus differed  from
the approved budget.
General  purpose  transfers
Tihe  system of intergovernmental  relationships and the design of intergovernmental
transfers  in Viet Nam can clearly  be improved in a number  of respects:
First,  local authorities do not have much autonomy  and flexibility  in deciding  the
level  and  composition  of  their  expenditures.  With  virtually  no  independent  revenue-raisig
powers and  with both  revenue  assignment and expenditures  being decided  at the central  level,
local governments  are unable to increase outlays on agricultural  extension,  irrigation,  and roads.
30They  are  thus  unable  to exert  much  influence on either  the  pattern  of economic  growth  or,
indirectly,  on poverty alleviation.
Second,  the impression gathered from field visits to various provinces is that very
few  of  the  investment  projects  forwarded  after  feasibility  studies  are  included  in  the  plan.
Moreover.  the  repair  and  maintenance  expenditures  approved  are  only  a  fraction  of  those
requested  (and needed).  The criteria  determining which  projects  are selected are obscure.
Table  12
Per  Capita  Revenues  and  Expenditures  - Targets  and  Estimates
Per Capit  Rcevcnues  - 199  Per Capiu Expendicurcs 1993  1
TarScEs  Latest  Increasc  in  Percen-  Targets  Latest  Increase  in  Percen-
(Th.  Estimates  Estitnaes  tacg  (Th.  Estinate  Estimates  tage
dongs)  (h  over  Increase  Dongs)  (Tb.  ovcr  Inasc
Dongs)  Targets  Dongs)  Targets
Cmb  (Th-
Dones)  Dongs)
High inctimn  656.43  758-10  101.67  15.5  178.53  230.2  51.67  28.9
provinces
Middle  income  95.43  111.19  15.76  16.5  95.65  122-45  26.80  28.0
prov  mnce%
L,w  Inictmnic  54.53  69.92  15.39  282  104.73  135.76  31.03  29.6
provinces
All  Ponvinces  27S.60  323-89  45.29  16.3  126.54  162.99  36.45  288
Source:  1. State Planning Committee
2.Ministry of Finance. Government  of Viet Nam
Third,  as  noted above,  the norms used  for determining  expenditure  allocations
between different provinces could be improved by obtaining better information on unit costs and
by targeting  them more specifically  (e.g.  on students,  rather  than on population).
31Fourth.  the  lack}  of  stability  in  tax  assignments  and  tax  sharing  arrangements
creates  botlh uncertaintles  and disincentives  for provincial govemments.  Uncertainty  in revenues
renders  planning  for  the medium  term  difficult.  In addition,  larger  revenue  collections  in  a
province  in one  year  set higher  targets  for the  next year and appear  in at least  some cases  to
result in a lower provincial share of turnover  taxes.  In Ha Noi, for example,  revenue collections
in  1993 were  highler than  the previous  year  by  over  50  per  cent  and  exceeded  the  budget
estimates  by  15 pur cent.  Much  the same  happened  in  1992.  Consequently,  the  share  of
turnover  tax accruing  to the cint was reduced  from 70 per  cent in 1992 to  36 per  cent in  1993
and was  further  reduced to just  6.3  per  cent in  1994.
Fifth,  the lack of transparency  in the method of allocating investment expenditures
and  the  complicated  method  of  determining  recurring  expenditures  make  the  interprovincial
distribution  of  social  and economic  infrastructures  a  matter  less of objective  analysis  than of
negotiation  and  bargaining.  In  the  final  analysis,  the  allocation  of  expenditures  basically
responds to bureaucratic  and political judgments  at the central level, but the relationship between
political  leaders  at the central  and  provincial  levels also  appears  to  play an  important  role  in
expenditure  allocation.
The  impact of these and other factors on the provision  of public  services to poor
people.  particularly  in the poorer  parts of the country,  is on the whole  adverse.  On one  side,
the  predominant  role  of population  in determining  the expenditure  norms  obviously  tends  to
equalize  expenditures;  on the other,  population  is not necessarily  an  accurate  way to measure
'need.'  Similarly,  one  reason  higher  weights  are  assigned  to  sparsely  populated  and
mountainous  regions  is presumably  to  take  their  higher  unit  costs  of  providing  services  into
account,  but  no one  knows  exactly how these weights are derived,  or if they accurately  reflect
cost  differentials.  Given  the  general  tendency  to  underestimate  revenues,  affluent  and  fast-
growing  provinces  can  generate  larger  per  capita  surpluses  over  targeted  revenues,  thus
accentuating  inequalities  in  social  and  economic  infrastructures.  Given  the  backlog  in
32infrastructure  in  poor  provinces,  even  when  equal  per  capita expenditures  are  allocated  for
investment.  these  provinces  will  find  it difficult  to  'catch  up'  with  their  more  prosperous
counterparts.  To  the extent  the development  potential  of these regions  is equal,  this is clearly
detrimental  to economic  growth.  Even if poorer regions  are poor in part because of a deficient
resource  base.  so that  in the  long run  it might  be advisable  for  people  in search  of a  higher
income to move to where  they can be more productive,  it is generally in the national  interest to
ensure  that educational  and health standards  meet at least minimal national standards.
The  allocation  of expenditures  among  different  provinces  does  not  succeed  in
offsetting  the revenue  and cost disabilities  of the pooTer areas.  On the other hand,  the central
allocation  of expenditures  does result in expenditures  being more equitably  distributed  than if
the expenditures  are incurred according to revenue derivation.  The correlation analysis reported
in  Table  13  confirms  that  provinces  with  higher  per  capita  GDP  had  higher  per  capita
expenditures.  Moreover,  per  capita expenditures  were  higher  in  more  densely  populated
provinces,  which  perhaps suggests that the hi-her  unit costs  in mountainous  and  remote  areas
are not adequately  reflected  in the determination of aggregate expenditures. "7 The expenditure
pattern  has  no  si-nificant  association  with  infant  mortality  rate,  another  'need'  variable.
Similarly,  per capita actual expenditure  in 1992 is not significantly correlated  with the illiteracy
rate.  but the budoeted expenditures  in 1993 has a significant correlation.  However,  both actual
and budcgeted  expenditures  are significantly negatively correlated with agricultural  productivity.
The  picture  is similar  for  current  and  capital expenditures.  Both  are  higher  in
more developed  provinces.  Per capita capital and current expenditures  are significantly  related
to per capita industrial  output, but per capita agricultural  output and productivity are  negatively
associated.  Capital expenditures  in provinces with  higher  infant mortality  rates  and  illiteracy
were  higher  in  1993 though  there  was no  significant  positive  correlation  in  1992.  Current
expenditures,  however,  showed no significant correlation  with these need variables.
17  This result may also be because the population density in the relatively affluent provinces is
simply higher.  But the results of multivariate  analysis shown later also support the above observation.
33Table  13
Correlation  Coefricients of Per  Capita  Expenditures
with Capacity and  Need Variables
Current Expenditure  Capital Expenditure  Total Expenditurc
5  I992  1993  I  7  1993  1993
A.  Variable  Representing "Capacity'
1.  Per capita GDP (1989  0.574*  0.338*  0.3660  0.282**  0.543*  0.327*
prices)
2.  Per capita aigricultural  .0.424*  -0.354*  -0.351*  -0.388*  -04426*  -0.368
productmin
3.  Per capita industrial  0.479*  0.243**  0.279"*  0.207  0.445*  0.236**
production  eicr  capita
4.  Per capita production  0.493*  0.179  0.216  0.136  0.368*  0.170
(Industry +
Agzriculturc)
B.  Variable Representing 'Need'
5.  Population deLnsity  0.324*  0.349*  0.132  0.239**  0.2R3*"  0.323*
6.  Road len-thisq.  knm.  0.050  0.122  -0.008  0.10  0.035  0.092*
7.  Agricultural  -0.228**  -0.282**  - 0.277*  -0.350'  -0.257**  -0.305**
prtductivily
S.  Infant Mortality Rate  0.093  0.144  0.053  0.244''  0.086  0.174
9.  Illiteracy Rate  0.160  0.214  0.140  0.365'  0.163  0.259**
1992  - Actuals  1993 - Budget Estimates
Significant at I per cent level
Significant at 5 per cent level
Source:  Staff  Estimates based on information provided by the Ministry of  Finance and State Planning Committee,
Government of Viet Nam.
34Table  14
Inker-Provincilu  Variationis  in l'er Cnpita Expenditures: Regressioti  ResUIts
===  ~~~~~~~~~~1.  Linealr  Equatlionn  II1. Lozg-L.inc;ur  Eqiuatio)ns
Independent  Variables  Total Eap  endi-  Titatl ExpIendi-  Currcnt  Expendi-  Current  ExpeLndi.  Total Uxpendi-  Trn:ti  IRxpesidi-  Currelit  Current  Expenditure
ture  (1992)  lure (1993)  ture  (1992)  [Lire  (1993)  lure  (19921  lure (1993)  lExpetidittirc  (1992)  (1993)
Constant  78.47450  '  85.6801  "  .27.2925  .59.7011  " '  0.7706  1.3153  0.3465  0.2444
(1.9627)  (1.9460)  (.0.9904)  (.1.7958)  (0.7260)  (1.2016)  (0.3078)  (0.2169)
Per  capita  GDP  0.0883'  0.0490'  0.0824'  0.0533'  0.6512'  0.49X7'  0.6501'  0.5775'
(5.1232)  (2.9620)  (7.4827)  (4.5983)  (6.6394)  (5.1592)  (6.9738)  (6.4965)
Population  density  0.0525'  0.0759'  0.0149  0.0211  *0.0756  .0.0209  *0.1169'  *0.1084"'
(2.9370)  (3.8386)  (1.3349)  (1.5712)  (-1.2083)  (.0.3175)  (-2.4647)  (-2.2957)
Agricultural  .20.6833  '  -25.4634"  . . -0.3553'  -0.4748".
productliviy  (-2.5513)  (-2.8317)  (-2.1285)  (-2.6999)
Illiteracy  rate  1.7383'  2.3134".  0.2446*  6.3051"  .
(2.3005)  (2.7598)  (2.2682)  (2.6933)
Infant  mortality  rate  . 0.3415  0.4450  0.0746  0.0902
(0.7023)  (0.8242)  (0.4243)  (0.4869)
Length  of roads  per sq.  -9.0623  -6.8225'  -27.87650  .27.42814'*  0.0410  0.0611  -0.0153  0.0575
km. area - (-0.4154)  (-0.2821)  (-2.1605)  (-1.7522)  (0.7706)  (1.0974)  (-0.3252)  (-1.1855)
Enrolment  ratio  . .17.3764  -0.1764  . -0.1870  0.0200
(-1.4597)  (-0.0122)  (-1.5992)  (0.1708)
Teacher  - student  ratio  -. -0.3371  -0.0309  . . 0.1611  0.2303
(-0.5685)  (-0.0430)  (0.7177)  (0.9924)
Hospital  beds  per 1000  16.6056'  19.5164'  0.2939'  0.2463"
persons  (4.0406)  (3.9126)  (2.6172)  (2.1310)
Hospital  staff  per 1000  . . 39.1342'  47.06760  . . .
persons  (4.5253)  (4.4741)
2  0.4918  0.4452  0.6567  0.5332  0.4935  0.4122  0.5408  0.5089
1
P  9.3860  7.9539  15.2124  9.4841  9.4438  7.0776  11.2058  8.6987
Significant  at I per  cent  level,  "  Significant  at S Fer  cent  level. **  Significant  at 10  per cent  levelI'lie regression results for interprovincial  differences  in per capita current,  capital
and total  expenditures  presented  in Table  14 generally  confimi  thcsc observations.  In all  the
equations.  the regression  coefficient  of per capita GDP is positive and significant for both  1992
aiid 1993.  Similarly,  population  density  shows  significant  diseconomies  of scale though the
rate of increasc  in expenditures  was lower  as the rate of population  density increases (log-linear
equation).  These  regressions do suggest,  however,  that there  is some attempt  to spend more  in
provinces  with  lower  agricultural  productivity  and  higher  illiteracy  rate.  But  per  capita
expenditures  were not significantly  related to other need variables  such as infant mortality  and
road  length  per sq.  knm.  of area.
Unfortunately,  data  on  provincial  expenditures  at  the  required  level  of
disaggregation  are available  only  for  education  and  health.  Similar  correlation  and  regression
analysis  was  carried  out  for  per  capita  education  and  health  expenditures  with  various
-capacity'  and  need'  variables.  The results (not presented in detail here) are broadly similar
to  those  already  discussed,  although  some  interesting  observations  emerged.  For  example,
although the budgeted expenditures  on education and health in 1993 in different  provinces were
not si-nificantly  correlated  with per capita GDP,  actual expenditures  in 1992 were significantly
hiiher  in provinces  having higher per  capita GDP.
Expenditure  on education  was higher in provinces  with a higher  illiteracy  rate,
but  there  was  no  significant  correlation  with  population  density.  Interestingly,  education
expenditure  was negatively and significantly correlated with enrolment ratios. It is not clear how
to  interpret  this  result.  If the low enrolment  ratio is due to  inadequate  facilities  for education,
presumably  higher expenditures  in low enrolment provinces would increase enrolment.  But this
scenario  seems  unlikely  in Viet Nam,  where  facilities  (as evidenced by the ratio of teachers  to
school  going  population)  are  fairly  evenly  spread  across  the  country.  In  this  instance,  the
negative  correlation  may perhaps  indicate that more  is spent on education  in provinces  where
the effectiveness  of such expenditure  may be lower.
36In the case of health expenditures,  significant pusitive correlationi with population
density  suggests,  as  mentioned  above,  that  there  may  be  inadequate  recognition  of  cost
disabilitics  in  sparsely  populated  provinces.  Although  per  capita  health  expenditure  has  no
correlation  witlh such 'need'  variables  as infan,ut  mortality  rates,  it is, unsurprisingly  influcnccd
sienificantlv  bv the number  of health workers and hospital  beds.
One way to analyze inter-provincial redistribuLion is by examiiining  the diffcrence
btLween the revenues collected  in a province and provincial expenditures.  The elasticities of per
capita revenues  an-id  per  capita expenditures  in a log-linear equation  arc as follows:
I . Log  (R)  =  -2.8141  +  1.2362  log (y)
(-3.4369)  (8.9660)
-2
R 0.604  F  =  80.389  N  =  53
2.  Log  (E)  =  2.3487  +  0.4044  log (y)
(3.6976)  (3.7812)
-2
R =  0.204  F  =  14.297  N =  53
Where  R  =  Per capita Revenue collections  in the provinces in  1992.
E  =  Per capita expenditures  in the provinces  in  1992
y  =  Per capita  GDP in the provinces in  1992
[Figures  in the parenthesis  denote  't'  values of the regression  coefficients.]
These regressions,  as illustrated in Figure  1,  bring out two important conclusions.
First,  the income elasticity  of expenditures  in 1992 (0.404)  was substantially  lower than that of
revenues  (1.236).  That  is,  expenditures  are  much  iore  equally  distributed  than  revenues.
Second,  in spite of this equalization,  per capita expend'-:ire was significantly higher in provinces
with higher per capita GDP.  On average,  when the pzr capita GDP was higher by one per cent,
expenditure  was higher by 0.40  per cent.
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In addition, there may of course be significant tax  and expenditure spillovers
across  provinces.  In  1992, for  example, total  expenditure of  the  central  and  provincial
governments together accounted for almost 25 per cent of GDP.  Of this, a little less than one-
half was contributed by revenues from State enterprises and turnover and profits taxes on non-
State enterprises: and about 4 per cent of GDP or 16 per cent of total expenditures was financed
by fiscal deficit.  Taxes on enterprises (profits tax, depreciation and turnover tax) are basically
collected predominantly from the two major cities (Ha Noi and Ho Chi Minh) by virtue of the
location of head offices of major enterprises and the concentration of production and trading
activities in these cities.  In reality, however, these taxes tend to be passed on to consumers
throughout the country.  Similar spillovers will also occur, probably to a lesser extent, on the
expenditure side.  Although the inter-regional incidence of various revenues and expenditures
is too complex a question to explore here, it seems reasonable to suggest that if these factors
were taken into account the net transfers received by the poorer provinces would be generally
lower than indicated by the gross transfer concept used in the preceding analysis.
38Specific  Purpose  Transfers
The basic transfer system  thus probably  does something, but not much, to alleviate
the effects of differential provincial capacities to provide services related to poverty alleviation.
As noted earlier. the central government has also introduced a number of special programs in
the  education,  health  and  social  welfare  sectors  which  are  implemented by  the  local
governments. However, apart from the pension  payments to war veterans, none of the programs
seems large enough to make any significant impact on poverty.
One scheme that is specifically targeted to alleviate poverty is a subsidized loan
pro-ram  introduced by the Treasury and implemented  through the Ministry of Labor to create
employment for the unemployed.  The program was introduced in mid-1992, and budgeted
expenditure is about D 250 bn in 1994.  The loans are given to individuals  (D 50 bn) and to
small enterprises and workshops (D 200 bn).  The scheme covers Ha Noi and Ho Chi Minh
cities and mountainous low density provinces. Loans for self-employment  at subsidized interest
rates are given after scrutinising applications  submitted to the Provincial Peoples' Committees.
The process is similar for the small enterprise loans, which are not directly targeted to the poor,
but are given to generate employment. Loans carry a monthly interest rate of 0.5 per cent for
loans up to one year, 0.4 per cent for loans up to 2 years and 0.3 per cent for loan up to 3
years.
This employment  program could be useful but at present it suffers frtom  a number
of shortcomings. First, it is only a small pilot program in two cities and a few provinces - and,
as mentioned earlier, the incidence  of poverty in the two major cities is relatively low.  in terms
of the amount of money spent, D-250 bn is less than 0.5 per cent of the total budget.  Second,
although the loans to enterprises  are ostensibly  given to generate employment, the recipients may
be quite affluent, and there is no mechanism in place to ensure that these enterprises in fact
generate the number of jobs as proposed, once the loan is received.  Third, the maxinum  loan
given to an individual is D-500,000 or about $ 45 (in Ho Chi Minh.city, it is D-600,000). Even
at a 25 per cent rate of return, the additional income generated will only be 125,000 or about
39U.S.  S12 per  year:  any  impact  on the living  conditions  of  the poor  is going  to be  marginal.
Moreover.  the fact that the loan is given for a maximum of three years makes it more  difficult
for  poor  persons  to  benefit  from  the  scheme.  Finally,  while  obviously  repayment  capacity
should  be taken into account  to some extent in any loan program,  there is no explicit attempt  to
allow for the intensity  of poverty  in determining  who benefits  from this program.
IV.  Reorganizing  Intergovernmental  Fiscal  Arrangements  for Poverty  Alleviation
Intergovernmental  fiscal arrangements  in Viet Nam need to be reoriented in order
to  improve  the consumption  standards  of the poor,  particularly  those living in the poorer  areas
of the country.  Poverty  alleviation  through economic growth  reouires that the supply  of social
and  economic  infrastructure  responds  adequately  to  the  increasing  demands  of the expanding
market  economy.  Appropriate  fiscal decentralization  can help in this task. Concern is sometimes
expressed  about the possible  effects of decentralizing  public  sector activities  owing to the poor
quality  of  local  government  administration  in many developing  countries.  To  a considerable
extent,  however.  each country gets the local government  it wants. In Viet Nam local government
officials,  like those  anywhere,  respond  to the incentives  with  which  they are  faced.  If those
incentives discourage  initiative and  reward  inefficiency,  then  it should come as no surprise  to
find inefficient local governments.  The answer to this problem,  if it is one,  is obviously to alter
the incentive structure  to make it possible and attractive for honest, well-trained  people to make
a career  in local government.  Similarly,  -'ie  answer to local governments  that make  "wrong"
decisions is to provide an incentive structure that leads them,  in their own interests,  to make the
''riclht"  decisions,  that  is,  decisions  that  are  both  economically  efficient  and  politically
acceptable.  The fiscal arrangements  needed to  achieve this  result will promote  accountability
and provide  incentives for  the cost-effective  provision  of public services.
To the extent  local governments  are best suited to providing the services needed
to accelerate economic growth and reduce poverty, they should therefore  have a greater  role both
in raising revenues and in allocating expenditure,  subject to the provision of adequate incentives
to ensure  that they do so in a responsible  and efficient way.
40One aspect of greater fiscal autonomy is the power to raise revenues.  At present,
the provinces  can increase their  spending  only when the actual collection  of revenues assigned
to  them  exceeds  the  budgeted  targets.  As  the  tax  department  is  not  entirely  within  their
jurisdiction.  provinces  thus have  little flexibility  in raising  revenues.  Moreover,  the provinces
do  not  have the right to determine  the rates of any taxes.  If provinces  are to be able,  within
centrally-detennined  limits,  more  freely to determine their  level and composition  of spending,
they will need more independent  revenue-raising  authority.  Of course,  the power  to levy taxes
whose  bases  are mobile  across  different  provinces should  remain  with  the  center,  and  local
governments  should be restrained  from  imposing taxes that will basically  be exported  to other
areas.  The  basic  principles  of  local  revenue assignment  are:  (i)  Local  own-source  revenues
should  ideally be sufficient  to enable at least the richest local governments  to finance from  their
own resources  all  local services  primarily  benefitting  local  residents(as  opposed  to  those  with
si_nificant externalities such as education);  and (ii) to the extent possible,  local revenues should
be  collected  from  local  residents  only,  preferably  in  relation  to  the  perceived  benefits  they
receive  from  local services.
When  transfers  are  needed  to  finance  local  expenditures,  they  should  provide
incentives for  local revenue mobilization  and,  as a rule,  allow for some degree of equalization
The critical  point is that  local  governments  must,  if they are  to be  held accountable  for  their
acElons. have some responsibility  for determining tax rates.  This would both allow them to vary
rates to collect larger revenues to finance higher levels of public  services if they so choose and
at the same time allow the central govermnent  to design  its transfers  in such a way as to ensure
that local fiscal efforts were not discouraged  by the receipt of such funds.  Vesting the provinces
with  at least some  independent  revenue-raising  authority  is essential  to  establishing  a  linkage
between  revenue raising and expenditure  decisions at the margin.
Of course, if local goverrunments  are vested with the power to levy important taxes,
inevitably  richer provinces will collect larger revenues.  To offset  this disequalizing  effect,  as
just  noted,  transfers can be designed to provide sufficient revenues to local governments  to carry
out a "standard"  (minimum) set of local expenditure,  as set for example by a revised (and more
41accurate) set of norms,  provided they levy taxes at average national rates.  If they lower taxes
below this level. they are not rewarded by higher transfers: the result is thus that local residents
are  penalized.  If.  on the other hand, they raise taxes above the required level,  then total
expenditures may be increased.  The precise design and implementation of such a transfer
system would require further study, but it should certainly be feasible in Viet Nam, if desired.
Sensible local government decisions require a  greater degree of  stability and
certainty in  financial arrangements than now prevails: the  new budget law  would improve
matters in this respect.  A more scientific method of forecasting revenues and expenditures
would also be an improvement, although this too is a matter for further study.  As in the case
of transfers, simpler and more transparent arrangements in determining investment allocations
are also needed.
Another area where reform seems needed is in regard to the special programs
initiated by the center.  Most of them are so small they seem unlikely to have any significant
impact on anything.  It would seem more sensible to focus on a few programs that might have
an impact on poverty reduction. Providing drinking water, family planning, and adult literacy,
for instance, are programs that would appear useful from this perspective. Programs to combat
widely prevalent diseases (like malaria and goitre) may also of course be essential. Given the
nation-wide externalities  from spending on human  capital formation, provincial initiative in these
areas may be encouraged by specific purpose matching grants. There may also be a place for
such grants, at higher rates of subsidization, in mountainous regions and for ethnic minorities.
If the provinces are given the right to  levy and collect some taxes,  introduction of specific
purpose  transfers  with  matching  resource  requirements can  result  in  greater  provincial
participation and help to  augment more  resources for their special programs.  The correct
matching rate is, in this approach, set by the size of the spillovers.  Basically, a matching grant
program designed to encourage the optimal provision of public services should therefore vary
primarily  with  the  nature of  the  activity,  that  is,  depending on  the  level of  associated
externalities. Since, however, no country has achieved fIll equalization  of local fiscal capacities,
a uniform matching level offering the same "price" to all  local goverrnents  will yield non-
42uniform  responses  in rich and poor  localiries.  Even if revenue bases are fully equalized,  need
or  cost  differentials  may require  an  equalization  element  in matching  grant  formulas.  For
example,  per  capita  grants  for  roads in sparsely  populated  and mountainous  regions  should as
a rule be  larger simply because the per capita cost of achieving any particular  standard  of road
service  will obviously  be higher.
In mountainous  reaions and drought prone areas and in areas where  there is large
scale  unemployment  of  unskilled  labor,  perhaps  a  rural  works  program  of  creating  wage
employment  can be introduced  to create infrastructures  like rural roads, creating  arnd  deepening
of ponds, lakes and canals, repairing  and strengthening  of embankments and building school and
health centers.  Such a program  miaht,  for example,  generate a fixed number of person days of
employment  during  the  lean season.  One advantage  of  such a  program  is  its  self-selection
process:  targeting  the  program  to  benefit  the  poor  is  easy  as only  the poor  will  seek  such
employment.
In evolvina  improved intergovernmental  fiscal arrangements,  it is obviously useful
to build on the existing system  to the extent  possible by minimizing  its undesirable  effects and
imparting  the  necessary,  autonomy,  incentives  and  accountability  to  various  levels  of
government.  The key elements  in this process  would seem to include the following:
(i)  devolution  of some independent  revenue-raising  authority  to  local governments,
in particular,  the right to set the rates of some local  taxes;
(ii)  creation of a more adequate method of resolving vertical and horizontal imbalance
through  revenue  sharing arrangements  and general purpose  grants;
(iii)  identification  of activities for which specific purpose transfers should be made and
determination  of  the  matching  requirements  that  should  be  established  for
different  provinces;
43(iv)  provision  of adequate stability in intergovernmental  fiscal arrangements;
(v)  and perhaps,  although  this aspect has not been discussed here,  the assignment  to
the provinces  of some limited borrowing  powers  for investment purposes.
A system  along these lines should prove  much  more responsive to  the changing
needs of an emerging  market eccnomy  while providing  social and economic infrastructure  in an
efficient  manner.  An Organic  Budget Law has been under  preparation  in Viet Nam for the past
two years  now.  It has undergone  several revisions;  the  most recent  version,  September  1994
does  contain  many of the suggestions  made here.  However,  further  revisions  are  expected  in
early  1995. On paper,  Viet Nam  currently  has a highly  centralized  public sector;  in practice,
however,  the way the system  works- is to produce unplanned  decentralization  which  basically
places  the poorer  provinces  in a relatively  weaker position.  More formal decentralization  in a
coordinated  and  coherent  framework  along  the  lines  sketched  above  would  be  a  substantial
irnprovement  and could prove  a substantial  step towards  the implementation  of more  effective
policies  for poverty alleviation.
44Annex  I
The Draft Budget Lawv
A new State  Budget Law  regulating  the budgetary  process  is expected  to be considered
by  the  National  Assembly  in  June,  1995.  Several  drafts  of  this  proposed  law  have  been
considered  during  the past  2 years.  The  latest  draft  (dated  September  1,  1994) would  affect
some  important  aspects of  the present  system  while  leaving  others  unchanged.
(i)  Instead of the entire  national  assembly,  its standing  committee  would  decide  the
current  and capital  expenditures  at the Central  and provincial  levels.  It  will also
decide  on the volume  of  Central  transfers  to the provinces  (article  18).
(ii)  The draft  budget  law sets  out  the revenues  and expenditures  of different  budget
levels.  The  expenditure  responsibilities  of the  central  government  (article  30)
include  state  administration,  defence,  price  support,  non-productive  economic
activities  of  the  central  ministries  and  state  agencies,  non-productive  training,
nationally  established  and  managed  aspects  of  health  care,  training,  education,
culture.  sports  and  scientific  research.  Investment  expenditure  on  basic
infrastructure,  key economic  projects,  state-owned  enterprises  and joint  ventures
is also  allocated  to the center.
(iii)  Provincial  responsibilities  (article  31)  include  expenditure  on  provincially
managed  state  activities,  economic  operations,  education,  health  care,  cultural,
social  activities,  scientific  research  and  sports managed  by the locality,  security
and  social  order  in  the  localities  and  investment  expenditures  on  basic
infrastructure  (excluding  the projects  administered  by the center).
(iv)  The revenues of the central budget (clause 28) will consist of external trade taxes,
special  consumption  taxes,  profits  and  income  tax  on  foreign  enterprises,
45individual income tax, revenues from activities like oil and gas, resources tax and
mineral revenues, profits and retained incomes from state-owned enterprises and
joint  ventures, proceeds from the sale of assets, and fees and non-tax revenues
specified  by the  goverm-nent.  The turnover  (value added) tax will be shared
betwveen  the center and  provinces,  with the shares will be determined by the
central novernment for a number of years.  In addition, the center may borrow
from domestic and foreign sources.
(v)  Provincial revenues (article 29) would consist of house and land taxes, a portion
of agricultural land use taxes, natural resources tax (except those assigned to the
Center), provincial share of turnover tax, taxes on land use transfer, license tax,
slaughter tax outside the communes, state economic activities specified by the
government, fees and non-tax revenues, grants from the central budget, and direct
foreign aid as permitted by the central government.
(vi)  Transfers  from higher to lower level governments (article 33) will be made to
support current expenditure obligations, which are  to be determined by factors
such as population, natural conditions, and the level of economic development in
each regions.  The transfers will  'take  into special account the need to create
favorable conditions for economic and social development in deep  and remote
areas,  former revolutionary bases, areas of minority peoples and disadvantaged
areas.'  Transfers to support capital expenditures will be made according to the
list of investment projects already reviewed and approved.
Some  of  these  proposals  seem  good  from  the  perspective  of  the  previous
discussion.  The proposal to assign specified revenue sources to the provinces and to have stable
tax sharing arrangements for the turnover tax  for a few years for example,  will bring about
some degree  of  stability,  reduce the  disincentives prevailing at present,  and  help  in better
planning of the provision of public services at local levels.  It is not clear from the draft law if
provinces would be able to set the rate of their assigned taxes or if this would still be done by
46the center. The September draft law refers only to the provincial level of local government and
removes specific reference (which appeared in earlier drafts) to the commune budget.  Since
many important pro-poor expenditure items are delivered at the commune level, this lack of
clarity could result in their underfunding.  Also, the tax department will continue to be under
the dual charge of the Ministry of Finance and the Provincial People's Cormnittees.  Investment
projects will continue to be decided in a non-transparent manner.
This draft law has undergone several revisions but has not yet been submitted to the
National  Assembly  mainly  because  of  the  sensitive  issue  of  central-local  relations.  The
September,  1994 draft version contained several important components which would increase
decentralization  of  both  expenditures and  revenues; make the  system of  intergovernmental
transfers more transparent; and increase the stability in the local budgetary process. This draft
law is expected to be revised once again in early 1995.
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